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Recently, a delicately designed Gedankenexperiment was proposed to check the self-consistence
of quantum theory in the description of the agents who are using this theory. It was demonstrated
that the quantum theory is inconsistent. Here a critical improvement is presented, which can lead
to a consistent explanation of the Gedankenexperiment by using quantum theory.
We first give a brief introduction to the Gedankenex-
periment proposed in Ref. [1]. Suppose that F, F, W,
and W are four agents in the experiment, which may
take many rounds. Each round of the experiment is car-
ried out as follows. There is a random number generator
based on the measurement of a quantum system R, whose
initial state is |init〉R =
√
1/3|heads〉R +
√
2/3|tails〉R.
For each round of the experiment, Agent F invokes this
random number generator and sends a spin S to agent F.
If agent F got |heads〉R, she sends |↓〉S to agent F, else if
she got |tails〉R, she sends |→〉S =
√
1/2(|↑〉S + |↓〉S).
Then agent F measures spin S in the orthogonal ba-
sis {|↑〉S, |↓〉S}. Next, agent W makes a measurement
with respect to a basis containing the vector |ok〉L =√
1/2
(|h〉L − |t〉L) on the lab L. L contains the agent
F and the quantum system R. Both L and L (intro-
duced in the following context) remain isolated during
the experiment unless the protocol explicitly prescribes
measurements applied to them. |h〉L and |t〉L are the
orthogonal states corresponding to agent F’s measure-
ment results |heads〉R and |tails〉R, respectively. If agent
W got the result ok, w = ok, otherwise, w = fails.
Then agent W makes an announcement to agent W
about his result. Then, agent W makes his own mea-
surement with respect to a basis containing the vector
|ok〉L =
√
1/2
(∣∣− 12 〉L − ∣∣+ 12 〉L) on the lab L. L contains
agent F and spin S at this stage.
∣∣− 12 〉L and ∣∣+ 12 〉L are
two orthogonal vectors corresponding to agent F’s mea-
surement results |↓〉S and |↑〉S, respectively. If agent W
got the result ok, w = ok, otherwise, w = fails. Here
ends one round of the experiment.
Analysing the results, one can find that the proba-
bility to get the result (w,w) = (ok, ok) is 1/12 when
one use the standard quantum theory to describe L and
L. However, if the agents make some logical reasoning
based on their own measurement results at hand and
three assumptions containing quantum theory, as shown
in Ref. [1], agent W will never get the result w = ok if
he knows w = ok, i.e., the probability to get the result
(w,w) = (ok, ok) is zero. Hence, the analyzation arrives
at a contradiction. The other two assumptions, except
quantum theory, seem to be reasonable, so the two au-
thors conclude that quantum theory cannot consistently
describe the use of itself.
In this work, we show that there exists a critical im-
provement of the above logical reasoning. We assume
that the three assumptions (Q), (S) and (C) given in Ref.
[1] are correct, and use them in the following derivation.
The key issue in the following derivation is that, for each
round of the Gedankenexperiment, agent W uses quan-
tum theory and actually had already acquired some in-
formation of lab L before he did the measurement on it.
Hence, W should make conclusion at some time point
based on the conclusions made by other agents at the
same time point.
Let us first see how quantum theory works in the per-
spective of W. Suppose that at one round of the exper-
iment, agent W gets the result w = ok. Agent W can
make the statement that ‘I am certain that F knows that
z = + 12 at time n:11’, as shown in Table 3 of Ref. [1].
After receiving the announcement from agent W that
w = ok at time n:21, agent W can also make the state-
ment that ‘I am certain that F knows that z = + 12 at
time n:11’ by using the same derivation as agent W has
used, i.e., using assumptions (Q) and (C). Furthermore,
agent W can make the statement that ‘I am certain that
z = +12 at time n:11’ according to assumption (C). In ad-
dition, according to Eq. (6) in Ref. [1], the measurement
of W at time n:20 does not change this certainty between
time n:11 and n:30. So, at the time before the measure-
ment with respect to a basis containing the vector |ok〉L,
agent W has already got some information of state |〉L,
he can confirm that |〉L = |+ 12 〉L. Suppose that at time
n:30, agent W did not make the measurement with re-
spect to a basis containing the vector |ok〉L, he made the
measurement in the orthogonal basis {|− 12 〉L, |+ 12 〉L}, he
would get the result z = + 12 definitely according to his
information w = ok and his knowledges (Q), (C), (S).
So, when he makes the measurement with respect to a
basis containing the vector |ok〉L, he has a probability
|〈ok|+ 12 〉L|2 = 1/2 to get the result w = ok.
Now we reanalysis the probability related to the mea-
surement result (w,w) = (ok, ok) in the logical reasoning
way. Obtaining this measurement result depends on four
conditions step by step, r = tails, z = + 12 , w = ok, and
w = ok. Their conditional probabilities are 2/3, 1/2, 1/2
and 1/2, respectively. So we get 23× 12× 12× 12 = 112 , which
is quantitatively consistent with the quantum theory re-
sult, Eq. (7) in Ref. [1]. Therefore, the contradiction
proposed in Ref. [1] is inexistent.
In order to see how the logical reasoning in Ref. [1]
breaks down, we focus on the inference from statements
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2TABLE I. Time evaluation of quantum states. |fails〉L and |fails〉L are the quantum states orthogonal to |ok〉L and |ok〉L,
respectively, their explicit expressions are given by |fails〉L =
√
1/2
(|h〉L + |t〉L), |fails〉L = √1/2 (|− 12 〉L + |+ 12 〉L).
operations given in Box 1 of Ref. [1] quantum states after the operations
initialization of quantum system R
√
1
3
|heads〉R +
√
2
3
|tails〉R
F measures R, sets the spin S
√
1
3
|heads〉R|↓〉S +
√
2
3
|tails〉R|→〉S
F sends spin S to F
√
1
3
|h〉L|↓〉S +
√
2
3
|t〉L|→〉S
F measures S
√
1
3
|h〉L| − 12 〉L +
√
1
3
|t〉L|− 12 〉L +
√
1
3
|t〉L|+ 12 〉L
W measures lab L
|ok〉L|+ 12 〉L (probability= 1/6)√
4
5
|fails〉L|− 12 〉L +
√
1
5
|fails〉L|+ 12 〉L (probability = 5/6)
W measures lab L
|ok〉L|ok〉L (conditional probability = 1/2, total probability = 1/12)
|ok〉L|fails〉L (conditional probability = 1/2, total probability = 1/12)
|fails〉L|ok〉L (conditional probability = 1/10, total probability = 1/12)
|fails〉L|fails〉L (conditional probability = 9/10, total probability = 3/4)
TABLE II. Pathways of W’s deduction through W, F, and F,
there is 9 different combinations of time points.
subject
pathway
W F F
W(t3)
t1 t1 t1
t2 t2 t2
t3 t3 t3
F
n:00
and F
n:01
to F
n:02
, where the conclusion w = fails
appears for the first time (see the discussion below Eq.
(4) and Table (3) in Ref. [1]). This inference is condi-
tional, and depends on the fact that the quantum state√
1/2
(∣∣− 12 〉L + ∣∣+ 12 〉L) can not be changed before agent
W’s measurement on lab L at time n:30. However, the
measurement of agent W on lab L at time n:20 breaks
this condition. This is because labs L and L are quan-
tum entangled to each other by the spin S sent from agent
F to agent F, any measurement on lab L will induce a
collapse of both quantum states |〉L and |〉L according
to quantum theory. For completeness, in Table I, we list
the time evaluation of quantum states for each step of the
experimental procedure given in Box 1 of Ref. [1], these
results are calculated by W using the standard quantum
theory.
Based on the above discussion, our logical reasoning
can be expressed explicitly as an Improved Assumption
(C):
Improved Assumption (C)
Suppose that agent A has established that:
Statement A(i):“I am certain that agent A′, at the same
time point as I make deduction, upon reasoning within
the same theory as the one I am using, is certain that
x = ξ at time t.”
Then agent A can conclude that:
Statement A(ii):“I am certain that x = ξ at time t.”
In order to see more clearly that this Improved As-
sumption (C) is consistence with Assumptions (Q) and
(S), we would like to give some illustration below. The
flow chart of the whole process is plotted in Picture 1.
We introduce here notations like F(t2)F(t2)W(t3)W(t3)
to represent a deduction by W at t3, through the con-
clusion by W at t3, through the conclusion by F at t2,
through the conclusion by F at t2. We will see it is cru-
cial and reasonable to take account of these time points
when someone deduces through another agent’s conclu-
sion. In the original paper, when W obtain w = ok, the
deduction F(t1)F(t2)W(t3)W(t3) made by agent W at t3
is “At t3, I am certain that, W is certain at t3 that, F is
certain at t2 that, F is certain at t1 that R = tails and
w = ok will not happen”. We need to point out that
the non-equal-time logical reasoning shown in the origi-
nal paper [1] is inconsistent at the very beginning: agent
W gets the measurement result w = ok at t3 (in our
notation, see Fig. 1), he uses Eq. (6) in the original pa-
per, the probability to get z = − 12 is zero, to derive the
result |〉L = |+ 12 〉L at t2, furthermore, he deduces that|〉L = |t〉L at t1. However, if |〉L = |t〉L at t1, equation
(6) in the original paper does not work. Straightforward
calculation shows that the probability to get z = − 12 is
1/2 in this case, not zero. The conclusion (|〉L = |t〉L)
is conflicting with the condition (Eq. (6) in the original
paper).
Furthermore, as shown in Table II, there are 9 different
deductions W could make at t3. One can check that, dif-
ferent deductions can lead to different conclusions. There
is no reason to abandon the other 7 non-equal-time de-
ductions. The equal-time deduction listed in Table II
seems to be special and it can help us to avoid the contra-
dictions induced by time back reasoning. We have shown,
see Table I, W’s deduction F(t3)F(t3)W(t3)W(t3) made
at t3 is “at t3, I am certain that, W is certain at t3 that,
F is certain at t3 that, F is uncertain at t3 that R = tail
and w = ok will happen with some probability”. Now
3FIG. 1. The flow chart of the whole process. M(A) stands for the beginning of the measurement performed by agent A. For
simplicity, we use ti represent both a time interval and an instant within this time interval, as illustrated in the picture. Once
W receives W’s result w = ok, he makes a prediction on the probability of event w = ok within the time interval t3, based on
quantum theory and logical reasoning.
let us show the detailed calculation of this probability by
logical reasoning based on the Improved Assumption (C)
and check that the result coincides with that obtained by
quantum theory.
Suppose at one round, saying round n, W receives the
announcement from W that w = ok at time t3, let us do
the logical reasoning in W’s perspective.
Step 1: W is certain at t3 that, W is certain at t3 that,
(i) using the standard quantum theory, the probability
to get this result (w = ok) is 1/6, (ii) the state of lab L
at t3 is
|〉W’s perspective
L
= |ok〉L =
1√
2
(|h〉L − |t〉L), (1)
and (iii) the state of lab L at t3 is |〉W’s perspectiveL = |+ 12 〉L.
In deducing point (iii), Equation (6) in Ref. [1] is used
by agent W.
Step 2: |〉L = |+ 12 〉L at t3 means that agent F is certain
at t3 that the state of spin S is |↑〉S. In F’s perspective
at t3, labs L and L are disentangled by her measurement
on spin S and W’s measurement on L cannot influence
lab L. Hence, F at t3 is certain that at t2, |〉L = |+ 12 〉L,
furthermore, F at t3 is certain that at t2, |〉L = |t〉L. We
(the authors of this correspondence) need to emphasize
that, the improved assumption (C) has to be equal-time
deduction. So agent F needs to know the state of L at t3,
otherwise we cannot use the improved assumption (C).
At any time, all of the agents know the experimental
procedure presented in Box 1 of Ref. [1], so agent F at t3
knows that there is a measurement of W on lab L. Using
the standard quantum theory, F can get that |t〉L at t2
would collapse to the mixed state of |ok〉L and |fails〉L
with equal probability 1/2 at t3 (F does not know W’s
measurement result),
|〉L〈|F’s perspective =
1
2
|ok〉L〈ok|+
1
2
|fails〉L〈fails|. (2)
Step 3.1: At t3, if |〉F’s perspectiveL = |ok〉L (correspond-
ing probability = 50%), agent F can make the following
logical reasoning. In her perspective at t3: she knows
that there is a measurement on lab L at time between t2
and t3, however, just like the Wigner’s Gedankenexperi-
ment mentioned in Ref. [1], in her perspective, her own
state is not affected by this measurement and also the
measurement of agent F on spin S, “I am what I was”. So
in her perspective at t3, the state of lab L which contains
herself |ok〉L is not changed from t1 to t3. The event “a
spin S sent from lab L to lab L” is also superposition
1√
2
(|“sent a spin S = ↓”〉 − |“sent a spin S = →”〉),
hence the state of lab L after agent F’s mea-
surement is superposition, |〉F’s perspectiveL =
1√
2
[
|“L = − 12”〉F’s perspective − |“L = failsL”〉F’s perspective
]
,
where |“L = failsL”〉 is defined as 1√2
(|− 12 〉L + |+ 12 〉L)
and |“L = − 12”〉 is defined as |− 12 〉L. We need to notify
that the two states |“L = failsL”〉 and |“L = − 12”〉 are
not orthogonal, in order to get a normalized superposi-
tion, the normalization factor has to be changed from
1√
2
to 1√
2−√2
. From agent F’s perspective, this state
is not changed by agent W’s measurement, so from the
superposition F’s point of view, the quantum state of
lab L at t3 is,
|〉F’s perspectiveL = 1√
2−√2[
|“L = − 12”〉F’s perspective − |“L= failsL”〉F’s perspective
]
.(3)
Under this condition, at t3, F’s prediction of probability
of w = ok is,
|“the probability of ‘w = ok’ ”〉F’s perspective = 1√
2−√2[
|“the probability of ‘w = ok’ = 12”〉F’s perspective−
|“the probability of ‘w = ok’ = 0”〉F’s perspective
]
. (4)
From agent F’s perspective, agent F in the superposition
state of lab L does not have the ability to give a defi-
nite conclusion about what the probability of w = ok is:
i.e., if she has such an ability to make a statement, e.g.,
“I (agent F) am certain that the probability of w = ok
is 1/2”, which demonstrates that L is not superposi-
tion, |〉L = |t〉L in this case, and conflicts with agent
F’s judgement of lab L at t3. However, agent F knows
that |〉L = |ok〉L, so if she opens the lab L at t3, there is
a probability
(
1√
2−√2
)2
= 1
2−√2 to receive the message
4“the probability of w = ok is 1/2” from agent F, and a
probability 1
2−√2 to receive the message “the probability
of w = ok is 0”. So, without confusion, we can effec-
tively say that “(From agent F’s perspective at t3) agent
F is certain at t3 that the probability to get w = ok is
1
2−√2 × 12 + 12−√2 × 0” in this situation.
Step 3.2: If |〉F’s perspective
L
= |fails〉L (corresponding
probability = 50%), agent F can use a similar logical
reasoning and get that the probability to get w = ok is
1
2+
√
2
× 12 .
All of the considerations presented above are carried
out at time t3, and we (the authors of this correspon-
dence) need to emphasize that all of the above consider-
ations are essentially carried out in agent W’s mind. Now
agent W can make the deduction using the Improved As-
sumption (C):
Statement A(i): “I am certain at t3 that, W is certain
at t3 that, F is certain at t3 that, 50% probability that
F is certain at t3 that the probability to get w = ok is
1
2−√2× 12 and 50% probability that F is certain at t3 that
the probability to get w = ok is 1
2+
√
2
× 12 .”
So agent W can make the following deduction:
Statement A(ii): “I am certain at t3 that the probabil-
ity to get w = ok is 50%× 1
2−√2× 12+50%× 12× 12+√2× 12 =
1
2 .”
The probability to get w = ok is 1/6, so agent W
can conclude that the total probability to get (w,w) =
(ok, ok) is 1/12.
So we conclude that the Improved Assumption (C) can
handle the contradiction discussed in Ref. [1], i.e., the
inconsistence of direct calculation using quantum theory
and indirect calculation based on logical reasoning.
Further Remarks: Among the above derivations, the
logical reasoning shown in Step 3.1 may make one be-
ing confused: what are the thoughts and logical reason-
ings of an agent who is in a superposition state? We
need to emphasize that: (i) when we use a superposition
state |ok〉L to describe an isolated lab L with an agent
F contained (like that considered in Ref. [1] and refer-
ences therein), we have to accept that every thing in the
isolated lab L should be superposition, e.g., agent F’s
notes written on a paper in lab L to remind herself in
future or other observer about her current measurement
results, her memory about the history, her judgement of
her current situation, her prediction of the future. (ii)
such a strange state is unobservable (at least for the cur-
rent experiment). Suppose at some time |〉L = |ok〉L,
agent W wants to see what this state is, and more inci-
sively, he wants F herself to tell him that she is in a su-
perposition state, then, he will find that, when he open
the lab, the state |ok〉L collapses to |h〉L or |t〉L imme-
diately and everything is normal and non-superposition.
This is because the pre-arranged experiment procedure
limited the projection operator (open the lab) to be{|h〉L〈h|, |t〉L〈t|}. (iii) we have to admit that the two
quantum states, |“the probability of ‘w = ok’ = 12”〉 and|“the probability of ‘w = ok’ = 0”〉 are not orthogonal.
Because the effective dimension of Hilbert space is 4 in
this problem. If different values in [0, 1] for the prob-
ability of w = ok refer to different (orthogonal) quan-
tum states, then the dimension of the Hilbert space will
be infinite. This discuss guarantees that the prefactor
1√
2−√2
6= 1√
2
is reasonable.
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